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ABSTRACT: This paper proposes a different theory of the firm and demonstrates how it can be 
employed to yield hypotheses about differences in innovation and human resource strategy 
according to the shareholder/stakeholder and liberal/coordinated market dichotomies.  The 
theory assumes that feasible production and demand sets are nonconvex due to interaction 
among activities; thus firms exist to permit the identification and exploitation of profit 
opportunities through coordinated action.  This implies that firms face a nonconvex profit 
landscape comparable to the fitness landscapes invoked in evolutionary biology.  Given the 
complexity of these landscapes and the uncertainty of the location of profit hills, there is a 
tradeoff between exploiting existing or adjacent hills and prospecting for more distant ones: the 
first minimizes risk, the second maximizes potential profit.  A further assumption is then 
introduced, that shareholder firms seek to maximizes the present value of expected future profit 
streams, while stakeholder firms maximize the likelihood of achieving profitability over a given 
time horizon.  Combining these theoretical priors, we characterize the likely innovation, 
organizational and human resource characteristics of the two types of firms and the effects 
exerted by their external environment, as described in the Varieties of Capitalism literature.  
These theoretical predictions are confirmed in a set of case studies of a stakeholder firm in 
liberal and coordinated environments and a shareholder firm in a coordinated environment.  
This is seen through differences in the role of worker problem-solving, which brings together 
innovation and learning, organizational structure and human resource strategy. 
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This paper is an attempt to bridge two worlds, economics and management, using a theoretical 
framework in which managerial issues of strategy and organization can be linked to economic 
modeling of profit opportunities.  The key element, which will be developed further on, is the 
concept of a profit landscape, which relates performance outcomes to configurations of activities 
in a manner that respects the complexity and uncertainty in which firms normally operate.  Aside 
from demonstrating this theoretical apparatus, our goal is to shed light on the way “varieties of 
capitalism” factors—whether the firm is responsive primarily to shareholders or to a broader 
array of stakeholders and whether its systemic environment is primarily “liberal” or 
“coordinated”—are reflected in organizational, production, and human resources choices that 
alter the position of workers within the enterprise.  Our path to profit landscape analysis will take 
us first through a coordinated-action (CA) theory of the firm, which is predicated on the 
assumption that the feasible production and revenue sets available to the firm are typically 
nonconvex, and complexly so.  From the analysis of alternative firm types we suggest different 
performance criteria, profit maximization for shareholder firms and profitability likelihood 
maximization for stakeholder firms.  Combining this difference in performance goals with profit 
landscape analysis, and taking into account the opportunities and constraints of liberal versus 
coordinated market environments, yields predictions for the strategic preferences of the different 
kinds of firms in the realm of skill development, organizational learning and innovation 
pathways, and these in turn point to consequences for the balance between autonomy, 
coordination and integration in the position of workers. 
 
The argument is summarized in Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1: The Argument of the Paper 
 
 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows: In Section I we will briefly discuss the context within which 
our discussion takes place.  There are several recent and ongoing literatures in economics and 
management that consider the interrelationship between the governance of the enterprise, its 
external context and its internal organization.  While our questions are somewhat different, we 
take notice of these parallel research streams.  Section II describes the CA theory of the firm, 
leading to the formulation of the profit landscape model which will be our workhorse in the rest 
of the paper.  In Section III we summarize the literature on liberal versus coordinated market 
economies and sketch the relevance of the shareholder/stakeholder distinction for the firm’s 
performance goals, showing how this leads to different strategies for navigating the profit 
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landscape.  Section IV applies these theoretical tools to our main question, how firm 
governance and the firm’s environment are related to the role of worker autonomy and skill in 
enterprise strategy.  In Section V we present case study evidence that illustrates how these 
factors have played out in actual firms.  We conclude with Section VI, where we identify 
important questions raised by our approach that future research can address. 
 
I. The Context of the Argument 
 
Several parallel research trajectories have addressed the question of how the external 
organization of the economy affects the internal organization of the firm and, to a lesser extent, 
vice-versa.  Our purpose here is to simply reference them.  As will be seen, we ask somewhat 
different questions, and our analytical approach does not correspond to theirs. 
 
A. Internal versus external labor flexibility.  In response to the evident transformation of labor 
relations in the United States and several other countries (e.g. Kochan et al., 1986), students of 
employment relations and strategic human resource management became interested in the 
potential downside of increasing labor market flexibilization.  It was noted that flexibility means 
one thing in the context of labor allocation within an enterprise and another across enterprises.  
In the first case, it refers to the ability to redeploy labor readily and without loss of productivity 
across tasks and units in response to changing production and demand conditions.  In the 
second it is about the ease with which workers can be recruited and separated, so that labor 
flows across employers and economic sectors are not encumbered.  This latter form of 
flexibility, which had become more prominent across much of the industrialized world by this 
point, is what is commonly referred to as labor market “reform”, for instance in the discourse 
surrounding credit conditionality in Europe and elsewhere.  Interestingly, an analysis of over 50 
of the most-used business administration textbooks at German universities showed that 
flexibility has a positive connotation in the fields of logistics and production, finance, marketing, 
accounting and controlling, planning, organizational design and process management.  Only in 
the field of human resource management is it presented as being negative as well as positive, 
and HR managers are advised that individual solutions are required to balance divergent 
interests regarding workforce flexibility.  (Nolte, 2007)  
 
A popular hypothesis is that there is a tradeoff between internal and external flexibility of the 
workforce at several scales.  (Atkinson, 1984)  First, at an economy-wide level, more liberal 
labor market institutions are sometimes held to undermine the committed labor relations on 
which production flexibility depends.  (Appelbaum et al. 2000; Michie and Sheehan, 2005)  As a 
general proposition, this has been disputed; perhaps it is possible for both forms of flexibility to 
coexist at this scale.  (Osterman, 2000; Kalleberg, 2001)  Second, firms are sometimes 
portrayed as choosing to pursue one or the other form of flexibility as a matter of strategic 
human resource management.  (Youndt, 1996; Lepak et al., 2003)  Third, firms are observed to 
separate their workforce into “core” and “periphery” components, with the first contributing 
internal flexibility and the second external.  (Cappelli and Neumark, 2004) 
 
Our concern in this paper is not with the allocation of labor per se.  It is possible for workers to 
be either more general or more task-specific resources within the firm without necessary 
consequences for their autonomy.  Of course, to the extent the investments in training, which 
depend on greater long-term commitment, support both allocative flexibility and autonomy, they 
will be correlated.  Nevertheless, the issues this paper is concerned with, while they parallel 
those in the internal/external flexibility literature, are sufficiently separate that we do not have to 
take a position on the flexibility debates. 
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B. The topic of worker autonomy in production systems has been broached indirectly in the 
context of organizational learning and team organization.  To the extent that workers are 
perceived as exercising autonomy, this is thought to happen via teams that are purposefully 
organized by management.  There is, of course, an immense literature on such teams—their 
productivity, the extent to which they are able to act autonomously, and their strategic 
interrelationship with other managerial choices and contextual factors. 
 
There is general agreement on the set of practices that are consistent with team organization.  
Roberts (2007), for instance, characterizes the elements of “modern manufacturing” as 
summarized in Table 1: 
 
Table 1: “Characteristic Features of Modern Manufacturing” 
 
Flexible machines, low set-up costs 
Short production runs 
Frequent product improvements 
Broad product lines 
Targeted markets 
Highly skilled,cross-trained workers 
Worker initiative 
Local information and self-regulation 
Horizontal communication 
Cross-functional development teams 
Continuous improvement 
Accent on cost and quality 
Low inventories 
Demand management 
Make to order, extensive communications with customers 
Long-term, trust-based relationships 
Reliance on outside suppliers 
 
Source: Roberts (2007) 
 
Worker initiative is one component of this package, as is self-regulation and committed, trust-
based relationships.  Thus worker autonomy is considered in a general way to be systemically 
related to other high-performance practices, but it is not addressed as a distinct topic.  Similar 
lists, incidentally, can be found in Paauwe (1994) and Baron and Kreps (1999). 
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C. The problem of firm- versus economy-level determinants of production systems has come to 
the fore due to the challenge of transnational production systems.  If these systems can be fully 
compartmentalized through outsourcing, of course, there is no problem of accommodating 
multiple national contexts to be solved, but assuming this compartmentalization begs the 
question.  For a variety of reasons, it is often the case that firms engaged in production across 
national boundaries are unable to seal off these activities from one another.  First, firms wish to 
diffuse their best practices, which are costly to identify and implement, throughout the 
enterprise.  Second, learning and innovation are of greater value to the enterprise if they can be 
derived from and applied to the widest possible scope of operations.  Third, firm-level 
governance structures, as well as the cultural investments we will describe later, are vulnerable 
or less effective if they are subject to geographical limitations. 
 
For all these reasons, a literature has emerged within international management on how to 
respond to differences in the legal, cultural and political environments within which business 
must operate.  This isn’t the place for an examination of this literature, but we hope that our 
approach to organizational issues will contribute to it. 
 
To sum up, our question about differences in the role of workers across different types of firms 
and economic systems is parallel in some respects to other currents in economic and 
management research, but it is different in the specific aspect of firm organization it addresses, 
and unlike them it is based on a theoretical approach that permits organizational and strategic 
questions to be investigated more comprehensively. 
 
II. A Coordinated Activity Theory of the Firm 
 
In this section we present an approach to the analysis of firms whose key feature is the concept 
of a profit landscape.  Such a landscape presupposes the nonconvexity of profit functions, and it 
poses questions regarding uncertainty, flexibility and learning (identifying the landscape and its 
changes through time) and the scope of the firm (its ability to navigate through the landscape 
via strategic plans). 
 
The dominant approaches to the economic theory of the firm currently center on contracting and 
its pitfalls.  The Coase view is that the make-or-buy decision would always be settled in favor of 
“buy” were it not for the frictions that accompany the searching and contracting aspects of 
reliance on the market.  Williamson takes this further by emphasizing the trust aspect of 
contracting: a firm substitutes institutional hierarchy—a command relationship—for markets in 
intermediate goods and services when hierarchy sufficiently economizes on trust.  Similarly, 
viewing the firm as a nexus of contracts calls attention to the mechanism design problem 
associated with the multiple contracting function of a single economic agent.  We do not wish to 
criticize these theories, since they capture aspects of real decision-making, but we regard them 
as not particularly useful for the purposes of this paper.  The principal-agent problem, which is a 
point of departure for standard theories, will appear for us to be a consequence rather than a 
prior cause of organizational form and strategy. 
 
Instead, we will develop a theory of the firm centered on the value to an entity of coordinating a 
set of decisions that would otherwise be made independently by separate entities.  It is a distant 
relation of two pre-existing theories, Schumpeter’s entrepreneurial view and Chandler’s 
assertion of economies of administration, but as we will see, it is based on a different 
foundation.  We will proceed in two steps.  First we will present the general, highly abstract 
argument for gains to coordination in environments characterized by interactive nonconvexity, 
and then we will apply this logic specifically to the theory of the firm, summarized in a profit 
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landscape.  Readers who want a refresher in the elementary analytics of the convexity 
properties of functions and their associated sets, distinguishing between increasing returns and 
interaction effects, can find this in the appendix. 
 
A. The convexity assumption in economics and its relationship to the case for the superiority of 
market organization. 
 
A set is convex if every point on a straight line drawn between two points in the set is also in the 
set.  A well-known example is the production possibility set found in most introductory 
economics textbooks, as depicted in Figure 2a: it shows the set of an economy’s feasible 
outputs of goods X and Y given available resources and production technologies.  Any 
combination of X and Y on the thick curved line or between that line and the origin is feasible.  A 
dashed straight line has been arbitrarily drawn between two feasible points, and it can be seen 
that the entire line falls within the feasible set.  A set is nonconvex, however, if it is possible to 
draw a straight line between two points in the set which contains points not in the set.  This is 
depicted in Figure 2b, another production possibility set, but containing a “depression”, such that 
the condition for convexity is not met.  Here a straight line drawn between two feasible points 
lies partly within the feasible set but partly outside it.  Such production possibility sets are 
seldom found either in introductory texts or even advanced research, a matter of considerable 
interest, as we will see. 
 
Inspection of Figure 2 yields two important insights.  First, there is a determinate relationship 
between the price system and the selection of points on the boundary of the feasible production 
set if that set is convex.  A price in the context of Figure 2 means a negative slope indicating 
how much of good Y trades for a corresponding quantity of good X.  Every point on the thick 
curved line in Figure 2a is associated with a particular price, the slope of a line exactly tangent 
to it.  Similarly, any price intermediate between the slopes at the X and Y intercepts is 
associated with exactly one point on the boundary of the feasible set.  Thus, given the 
assumption of efficiency—that only boundary points matter—the price system “controls” the 
physical allocation of X and Y, and the allocation of X and Y determines the corresponding 
price.  This is the underlying property of the conventional positive analysis of markets, the use of 
microeconomic theory to describe, explain or predict market outcomes. 
 
Figure 2: Two Production Possibility Sets 
 
 
 2a: convex      2b: nonconvex 
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The second insight is that, if a given price—a tradeoff between X and Y—reflects the relevant 
preferences of decision-makers, given the assumption of efficiency, a sufficient rule for 
maximizing the joint value of X and Y is to make any small adjustment (movement along the 
curve a bit to the NW or SE) that is value-increasing.  The decision-maker in this context could 
either be a group of consumers enjoying the benefits of consuming X and Y or producers 
enjoying the profits of selling X and Y to consumers.  This normative property is extremely 
important at each scale of the economy.  At the economy-wide level it argues for the 
decentralized procedures of a market, since each transaction can be regarded as a small step 
in the direction of a more desired allocation (otherwise it would not be voluntarily undertaken).  
At the level of an enterprise it indicates that “buy” should normally be preferred to “make”, since 
each such “buy” decision, if rational, moves the enterprise closer to its optimum, whereas 
“make” is less determinate with respect to incremental improvement—there isn’t voluntary 
choice on both sides, the producer and the user, to ensure that improvement has actually 
occurred, particularly with respect to all the other options that exist beyond the boundaries of the 
firm. 
 
The convexity assumption is essential to the case for incremental, decentralized, myopic 
decision-making.  This becomes clear when we examine Figure 2b.  Here neither the positive 
nor normative property holds.  There are multiple points on the production possibility boundary 
that correspond to the same price, so the price system no longer fully controls the allocative 
system.  Normatively, the traverse along the boundary to arrive at a preferred production of X 
and Y may require going “down” as well as “up”: decisions need to be far-sighted rather than 
myopic and, if different small movements along the curve represent decisions by different 
agents (as in the case of a set of transactions in a price system), coordinated rather than 
piecemeal and independent. 
 
The abstractions of the geometry translate into social theory in a straightforward manner.  There 
are two potential sources of nonconvexity, increasing returns and interaction effects.  Increasing 
returns refers to the notion that increases in some good, either as an input or output, yield ever-
increasing increments to whatever outcome is being generated.  Increasing returns to a factor of 
production mean that with the addition of each additional unit of that factor, output is rising at an 
increasing rate.  Increasing returns on the preference side mean that each unit consumed 
confers an ever-larger increase in the consumer’s well-being (and demand).  Increasing returns 
violate the usual “laws” of textbook economics by requiring initial allocations when returns are 
low in order to take advantage of the higher returns later on, such as when a firm must operate 
at a loss for a period of time in order to grow larger, so it can become profitable.  Increasing 
returns are common in modern production systems, and economic models that incorporate 
them often yield a role for interferences in the market, such as trade protection to nurture 
growing industries.  Nevertheless, economists normally assume the opposite: diminishing 
marginal returns to each factor of production and diminishing marginal utility of each good 
consumed. 
 
When economists hear the word “nonconvexity”, they reflexively think of the problem of 
increasing returns, but the theory of the firm discussed in this paper is based on a second 
source of this property, nonmarket interaction.  When economic actors interact through the 
marketplace, if all relevant production and demand sets are convex, and all the other necessary 
conditions (not discussed in this paper) are met, the market will incrementally bring them to an 
optimal state of affairs, and the price system will be sufficient to uniquely determine each 
person’s outcome.  Nonmarket interactions, however, potentially violate the convexity property 
and yield results like the one depicted in Figure 2b.  Quite simply, if what I want to do depends 
on what you do in a way that is not the result of market operations, in order to arrive at a 
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preferred state of affairs you and I may need to coordinate our actions in some fashion.  
(Technically, increasing returns violate convexity assumptions along the principle diagonal of 
the matrix of second derivatives of the function in question; interaction effects are represented 
by nonzero values in the off-diagonal elements.  Complexity arises from the potential for these 
values to take the form of higher-order functions of the dimensional arguments: the strength of 
the interaction effect changes as arguments change.) 
 
Many such interactions are constituted by what we call “culture”.  These include: 
 
shared affective responses (how your well-being affects mine) 
sociality (changes in well-being due to personal interaction with others) 
social norms (how a group’s behavior can generate a norm, which influences each individual) 
social discourse (how the stories we tell about our actions alter how others perceive their 
actions) 
reference group effects (how what I have affects how you value what you have) 
organization (how my actions within an organization affect others within the same organization) 
 
Other interactions are physical: 
 
proximity effects 
environmental effects 
public health effects 
 
Later in this section we will consider technical interactions that arise within production. 
 
A view of human beings acting within shared physical and cultural space would presume 
widespread interaction, with resulting nonconvexities in any economic set (feasible production, 
consumer preference, equilibrium portfolios, etc.) impacted by them.  Economists, however, 
have routinely assumed the opposite, that all relevant relationships in the economy generate 
convex sets, which is why their benchmark utopia is a world of infinitely many, infinitely small 
actors.  Explicit coordination need play no role at all.  Thus the paradise of the self-regulating 
market is also the pre-social world of the free-floating, unaffiliated individual.  Our purpose, 
however, is not to decry this situation but to see what can be learned from theories premised on 
interaction and nonconvexity. 
 
Fortunately, research streams have recently emerged in economics which incorporate 
interaction effects in modeling exercises.  General treatments of such modeling forms include 
Glaeser and  Scheinkman (2000), Brock and Durlauf (2001), Papandreou (2003) and Horst and 
Scheinkman (2006).  An example of the application of interactive nonconvexity to financial 
markets is Basu (2009); an application to labor markets is van den Berg (2003).  This paper 
applies a similar modeling orientation to the theory of the firm. 
 
B. The CA theory of the firm under conditions of nonconvexity. 
 
Firms exist, above all, because there are opportunities to profit from production possibilities and 
consumer demand that would not be met by the independent, uncoordinated exchange of goods 
by separate, unrelated actors.  A new market, for instance, may require coordination of 
production and marketing activities which independently would not be worthwhile: a producer 
would not voluntarily undertake the production without the activities of the marketer, and the 
marketer would not voluntarily undertake  her activities without a coincident choice by the 
producer.  That describes a situation in which there are nonmarket interactions between the two 
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actors which permit their collective choice to be superior to the sum of their individual choices.  
Of course, the various component entities of the firm are unlikely to come together out of a 
spontaneous, mutual realization of their joint benefit.  It is typically an active agent (the 
entrepreneur) who initiates the venture and elicits participation by agreeing to accept the largest 
share of financial risk associated with it. 
 
A useful way to think about entrepreneurship is as the formulation and implementation of a plan.  
An entrepreneur may have an idea for a venture which differs in some way from what is 
currently being done.  Perhaps this venture has not yet been undertaken because its particular 
configuration of activities has not been envisioned by anyone else.  The implementation of this 
plan requires assembling sufficient resources—equipment, materials, know-how, workers—to 
carry it out.  The make or buy decision is largely dictated by whether there are nonconvexities in 
a particular set of activities such that outcomes can be improved by direct coordination rather 
than decentralized processes brought together through purchase.  Thus, it is possible that many 
critical components will be unavailable on the market, or unavailable with the specific qualities 
or according to the specific schedule required by the entrepreneur, because there was no pre-
existing benefit for any such external supplier apart from the linked activities that constitute the 
entrepreneur’s business plan.  Imagine, for instance, Henry Ford attempting to purchase the 
various tools and dies that he needed for his first automobile assembly line from existing 
independent suppliers: these intermediate goods would not exist apart from his development of 
the entire productive system.  (Firms specializing in them would come into existence later, and 
this would change the make-or-buy calculus—as it did.)  In short, the slogan associated with the 
CA theory of the firm is that the firm exists to internalize nonconvexities. 
 
In order to put this theory to work, however, we will need a more developed conception of how 
firms confront and cope with nonconvexities in their ordinary, ongoing operations.  As a 
temporary convenience, we will assume that the purpose of the firm is to maximize profits.  
(This assumption will be modified in the next section.)  The conventional economic depiction of 
profit maximization is predicated on perfectly convex production and demand sets, and can be 
seen in Figure 3, derived from the usual assumptions on total revenue and total cost as 
functions of output q. 
 
Figure 3: Profit Maximization under Conditions of Convexity 
 
 
Profit as a function of output is monotonically increasing to the left of the unique profit-
maximizing output level q* and monotonically decreasing thereafter.  Note that q does not have 
  
10 
to be a physically distinct product.  It could be a quality of a product, such as a feature, a 
location or a delivery time.  If there were two such qualities, q1 and q2, the profit function would 
appear as a cone in three-dimensional space.  For n qualities the profit function would be a 
smooth (n+1) dimensional conical surface.  The profit maximizing rule is myopic and simple: 
consider producing just a bit more or less of any q and see what effect this would have on 
profits.  Always proceed with an incremental change that is profit-increasing.  When no such 
change is available, profits are at their maximum. 
 
While nonconvex profit functions are rare in economics, nonconvex “rewards” are well-known in 
evolutionary biology.  The relevant concept is known as a fitness landscape, and Figure 4 
provides a conventional representation. 
 
Figure 4: A Fitness Landscape 
 
In this figure the horizontal axes could be two traits (phenotypes) of an organism, with the 
organism’s evolutionary fitness measured along the vertical axis.  As can be seen, there is 
assumed to be nonconvexity of the fitness sets over both phenotypes.  This is because 
reproduction is the result of a complex interplay of organismic characteristics: more of one trait 
may be either better or worse for fitness, depending on the extent of the other, and vice versa.  
Such a figure is for illustrative purposes only, since real-world organisms have vast numbers of 
potential characteristics, achievable by mutation, whose reproductive effects are interactive.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that myopic adaptation—which is how evolution operates, since it is 
nonpurposive—is not sufficient to assure an organism of optimal fitness under the given set of 
environmental conditions.  Moreover, the fitness landscape moves as environmental conditions 
change, so even if optimal fitness were to arise in one context, it might prove to be a poor basis 
for adaptation to a new one. 
 
Now let us suppose that Figure 4 represents a firm’s profit landscape, where the horizontal axes 
represent two of its activities.  The vertical dimension represents the combined effect of 
production costs and sales revenues resulting from them, and it is assumed that, just as an 
organism’s traits interact to affect fitness, these activities interact to generate nonconvex 
profitability outcomes.  This interpretation, incidentally, parallels work stemming from operations 
research, such as Kane (1996) and Robertson (2004). 
 
At this point it may be useful to pause and consider what might be meant by “activities” in this 
context.  An activity is anything a firm might undertake which could influence, directly or 
indirectly, its profitability—an immense list, although some will obviously be more consequential 
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than others.  Examples include offering particular products, the qualities of these products, their 
delivery to particular places and times, the methods and resources employed to produce them, 
and activities undertaken to market them.  In other words, anything firms do to produce and 
market goods and services could serve as a dimension in its profit landscape, which acquires its 
complexity both from the range of activities that jointly determine profit outcomes and the 
number of inflection points on its surface, which reflects the extent of interactivity between them.  
As an example, a firm might offer accounting services to business clients.  Its activities include 
the professional and nonprofessional employees it recruits (and their particular qualifications), 
the specialties it offers in its services, the location it serves, the relationships it establishes with 
particular clients, the way it advertises its offerings, etc.  A firm exists because there are 
combinations of these choices which, if undertaken in a coordinated manner, will be more 
profitable than outsourcing them to separate producers and purchasing their services as 
intermediate products on a market.  This is the advantage of coordinated activity, and the 
relationship between these advantages and the many possible configurations of activity are 
summarized in a profit landscape. 
 
The analytical usefulness of the profit landscape appears when we consider what the firm is 
likely to know about it.  In very general terms, there are three dimensions that affect this 
knowledge, the complexity of the landscape, its perceptibility and the rate at which it changes. 
 
Let’s describe the landscape in terms of its hills—configurations of operational choices that are 
locally optimal.  A simple landscape has few hills; in fact, the assumption common in most 
economic literature is that there is only one, so that myopic improvement is always optimizing.  
Clearly, in a world of convexity the information burden of the firm would be small: it is necessary 
only to be able to compare small adjustments in output, product design, market strategy, 
employment policy, etc.  When nonconvexity is permitted, the firm needs to have some 
knowledge pertaining to relatively “distant” (non-incremental) reconfigurations in order to know 
whether it is operating on the right hill.  The more such hills there are, and the more 
multidimensional their inflection points (so that reconfiguration encompasses more aspects of 
the firm’s operations), the greater the information burden. 
 
The second consideration is what might be called the visibility of the landscape.  Since the 
information gathered from individual, incremental adjustments may not be sufficient to 
determine whether coordinated adjustments would be profit-increasing, the firm will want to 
know about the topography of the landscape at points some remove from its current operating 
position.  An arbitrary starting point is pictured in Figure 4, A.  A firm at A could benefit from 
knowing about other regions more profitable than this one.  A reasonable hypothesis is that, the 
more closely drawn a region is around the current position of the firm, the more it can utilize its 
existing operations to acquire information about it.  Points close to A might be disclosed by an 
observant, experimental (reflective) mode of work performance; those further from A, like the 
depicted local and global peaks, would tend to be perceptible, if at all, through more specialized 
learning activities, like R&D, less tied to current practices.  Moreover, it can be assumed that the 
more distant a region on the profit landscape is from A, the less the firm will know about it given 
a fixed learning effort.  Of course, the entire discussion of learning and purposive movement 
through a landscape has no counterpart in biological evolution. 
 
The third consideration is the rate at which the profit landscape is changing.  In evolutionary 
theory it is the change in fitness landscapes that drives genetic change.  The rate at which 
natural selection operates depends on the reproductive cycle of the species of interest, as well 
as the degree and range of genetic mutation affecting the traits determining fitness.  Thus, the 
more rapidly the fitness landscape is altered, the more endangered a genetic branch becomes.  
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Human institutions are purposive and can adapt to rapid changes in their environment if they 
have sufficient information, but learning also takes time.  In fact, it is often the case that a firm 
needs to unlearn what it has previously discovered about profitability in order to respond 
effectively to a change in its environment.  Both learning and unlearning take place over time, 
which means that firms in an unsettled environmental struggle with both a lack of knowledge 
and the problem of false knowledge. 
 
Incidentally, just as organisms can alter their fitness landscapes via their own activity, so can 
firms influence their profit landscapes.  We will abstract from such feedback effects in this 
paper, but it is an important topic for investigation. 
 
Table 2 translates the first and third of these abstract considerations into characteristics familiar 
to economic analysis. 
 
Table 2: Complexity and Rates of Change as Determinants of the Firm’s Knowledge 
Burden 
 
  Rate of Change of the Profit Landscape 
  Slow Fast 
 
 
Complexity of the 
Profit Landscape 
 
Simple 
Standardized production, 
stable technology and 
markets 
Standardized production, 
unsettled technology and 
markets 
 
Complex 
Customized production, 
stable technology and 
markets 
Customized production, 
unsettled technology and 
markets 
 
The information burden is least in the upper-left cell and greatest in the lower-right.  The 
qualitative nature of this burden depends on the second of our considerations, the extent to 
which new knowledge acquisition is tied to the performance of existing operations. 
 
Given that learning is costly and time-consuming, the ability to react quickly to unforseen 
movements in the profit landscape is significant.  All else equal, a firm is better off if it is able to 
respond quickly and flexibly to events that make current operations less profitable than “nearby” 
reconfigurations.  For instance, the structure of market demand may change unexpectedly, and 
a firm that can readily alter its output composition benefits relative to one that can’t.  Flexibility in 
this model has several dimensions.  (1) It encompasses learning about the immediate vicinity of 
one’s profit landscape in order to identify and exploit changes in it.  (2) It incorporates operating 
flexibility—human and physical resources that can be repurposed in response to new 
conditions—that would be represented as ease of movement through a profit landscape.  (3) It 
may entail selection of a local optimum whose surrounding region has fewer “troughs” (profit-
diminishing zones) that could impinge on the firm as a result of the general movement of the 
landscape.  To the extent that flexibility is costly, this view restates the familiar tradeoff between 
efficiency in exploiting a given opportunity and the less risky strategy of profiting over the current 
opportunity and a wider range of potential future ones.  This tradeoff, well-known in biology in its 
distinction between specialists and generalists, can also apply to firms. 
 
This analysis takes us some distance toward our larger point that firms have alternative ways to 
respond to their environment, but we need more theoretical elaboration to represent the 
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stakeholder/shareholder (firms) and coordinated/liberal (systems) dichotomies within the profit 
landscape framework, and then to link organizational form—in particular the role of workers—to 
them. 
 
III. Varieties of Capitalism, the Stakeholder/Shareholder Distinction and Implications for Profit 
and Performance 
 
Two distinctions are important for our purposes, the difference between stakeholder and 
shareholder firms and between liberal and coordinated economies.  These are related but not 
the same; it is possible to have one without the other. 
 
A. The stakeholder/shareholder distinction 
 
There are actually two dimensions to this distinction, governance and performance criteria.  
With respect to governance, the question is whether control is vested predominantly in equity 
owners, or whether it is distributed more widely across other constituencies, including the 
workforce, representatives of the communities in which the firm operates, institutional creditors 
(such as investment banks), and representatives of relational counterparties, both suppliers and 
customers.  This is a matter of degree, and many configurations of stakeholder governance are 
possible. 
 
On the performance side, the question is, what objectives does the firm pursue?  A shareholder 
firm seeks to maximize the value of its outstanding shares, which, if equity markets are efficient 
and responsive only to fundamentals, means maximizing the present value of future profit 
streams.  A stakeholder firm has to balance the interests of its shareholders against other 
interests—the quality and quantity of employment, contributions to local, regional or national 
economic growth and development, and service to other contracting parties.  There isn’t an 
accepted theory of how these interests are reconciled—particularly with respect to profitability—
but we will return to that issue momentarily. 
 
B. The liberal/coordinated market distinction 
 
After 1989 the contrasts within the capitalist world became more apparent and attracted greater 
research interest.  The thesis that emerges from the essays collected in Hall and Soskice (2001) 
is that there are two such general models in the modern world, the liberal and coordinated 
market economies.  The liberal version, represented by the US, relies to a greater extent on 
markets as decision-making mechanisms, as reflected in corporate ownership and governance, 
the role of financial markets, and labor market institutions that leave most matters to individual 
initiative and competitive outcomes.  Coordinated capitalism can be exemplified by Germany 
and places greater emphasis on firm-level, industry and societal collective goods and their 
institutionalized acquisition and management.  Coordinated economies tend to shelter corporate 
governance from financial markets and employed workers from competition with either the 
unemployed or those with lesser qualifications.  They include institutions for promoting greater 
investments in human capital and to promote collaboration between firms and between firms 
and other entities.  A further claim made by proponents of the varieties of capitalism perspective 
is that these characteristics logically cluster: there are synergies between them, such that 
countries that adhere to the liberal model in some respects are likely to adhere in others, and 
similarly with the coordinated model.  This receives empirical support from Hall and Gingerich 
(2009), drawing national-level cross-country data. 
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The varieties of capitalism approach has been challenged from several vantage points.  One 
initial criticism is that the dichotomy between the two models is overdrawn.  For instance, King 
and Rueda (2008) point out that there is substantial institutional variation within national 
economies, and in particular that systems viewed as coordinated typically contain liberal 
sectors.   Others question whether a two-way differentiation is sufficient (e.g. Freeman, 2000), 
and whether the scope and time frame capture the broader historical forces at work (Boyer, 
2007).  It has also been argued that differentiation within capitalism may be diminishing due to 
global competitive forces.  (Baccaro and Howell, 2012; O’Sullivan, 2003; Yamamura and 
Streeck, 2003; Katz and Darbishire, 2000)  A particular convergence mechanism of interest is 
that the liberal sector within coordinated economies may be expanding.  (Raess, 2014; Palier 
and Thelen, 2012; Silvia and Schroeder, 2007)  This latest wave of skepticism has not yet 
absorbed developments subsequent to 2008, however. 
 
As Boyer (2007) points out, from a methodological standpoint it is interesting that the varieties of 
capitalism literature tends to center on the agency of the firm.  To put it somewhat differently, it 
is often assumed that the predominance of stakeholder firms is the basis for a coordinated 
economy, while the economy-wide institutions of the coordinated economy support the 
functioning of stakeholder firms.  We recognize these linkages, but we think it is important to 
keep these two levels analytically separate: shareholder firms do operate in coordinated 
economies, and stakeholder firms often find themselves operating in liberal economies.  
Consider the rather standard list of features presented in Table 3: 
 
Table 3: Main Elements in the Varieties of Capitalism 
 
 Liberal market economies Coordinated market economies 
Ownership of firms Dispersed shareholders 
trading in asset markets; 
more recently private equity 
funds 
Stable cross-ownership of 
shares, bank equity positions in 
conjunction with credit, public 
ownership stakes 
Governance of firms Shareholder model; 
workforce is external to the 
firm 
Stakeholder model; workforce is 
internal to the firm 
Worker representation Decentralized collective 
bargaining only 
Centralized collective bargain, 
co-determination, works councils 
Worker motivation Monetary incentives and 
disincentives; minimal 
commitment by either 
workers or employers; 
reliance on external labor 
markets 
Substantial intrinsic motivation; 
high mutual commitment; 
substantial reliance on internal 
labor markets 
Skill formation Skill formation external to the 
firm (e.g. school system) 
Skill formation internal to the firm 
(OJT, apprenticeship) 
Innovation Embodied particularly in new 
enterprises; low entry barriers 
Embodied particularly in 
practices within existing 
enterprises; high entry barriers 
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Time horizon Short payback periods; 
limited investment in human 
capital 
Long payback periods; high 
investment in human capital 
Product market 
emphasis 
Low unit cost of standardized 
products; rapid exploitation of 
product cycles 
High flexibility and customization 
of products; continuous quality 
improvements to extend product 
cycles 
 
Some of the rows describe features with an important systemic component, such as skill 
formation and the legal framework for worker representation, while others describe firm-level 
factors, such as product-market orientation and styles of worker motivation.  Most have a foot in 
both levels, in the sense that they differ across firms but are responsive to economy-wide 
support and incentives, indicating that analysis has to encompass both levels.  A significant 
area of interest for us is the problem of the multinational firm organized along stakeholder lines 
which must operate in both coordinated and liberal environments. 
 
C. A theory of performance criteria in shareholder and stakeholder firms 
 
We previously introduced the notion of a profit landscape, but no distinction was made between 
different types of firms and their possibly differing performance objectives.  To adapt the 
landscape model to a world in which both shareholder and stakeholder firms exist, we need a 
theory that translates the distinction in Table 3 into the formal language of profit functions. 
 
The shareholder firm is unproblematic in this respect: its assumed goal is to maximize the 
discounted present value of its expected future profit stream.  This is what is meant by “profit 
maximization”. 
 
What about the stakeholder firm?  This firm is interested in profit for two reasons: shareholders 
constitute one portion of its stakeholders, and being profitable is a precondition for any other 
objective it may hope to realize.  As a simplifying device, let us assume that only the second 
reason applies—in practice, continued profitability may also be sufficient to satisfy the 
shareholders.  This suggests an alternative maximand: the goal of the shareholder firm is to 
maximize the likelihood of being profitable over a given time horizon.   
 
The relevant time horizon matters, but we will abstract from this consideration here.  What is 
essential is the difference between maximizing the expected value of profits versus the 
likelihood of being profitable.  We will interpret this in terms of the properties of profit landscapes 
discussed above. 
 
Without going into the analytics, we can directly see that the key difference is risk aversion: 
 
1. A stakeholder firm is less likely to undertake high risk–high potential return investments.  To 
the extent that more distant points on the landscape are more uncertain in their profitability 
outcomes, stakeholder firms will be drawn to innovative strategies centered more on those 
closer to its current position.  This also reinforces the strategy of pursuing innovations that 
exploit the unique characteristics of its physical, human and knowledge resources.  (Penrose, 
1959)  A shareholder firm, by contrast, is more likely to engage in “prospecting” for distant, less 
certain but potentially more lucrative opportunities.  Such a strategy is especially favored if the 
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firm's resources are nonspecialized, or if there is little cost to shedding old resources and 
acquiring new ones. 
 
2. A stakeholder firm places relatively less value on the prospect of a profit outlier.  The main 
benefit it acquires from a profit windfall is greater ability to engage in profit-smoothing over time; 
hence it experiences diminishing returns to such outliers, compared to a shareholder firm for 
which each increment of profit is of equal value. 
 
3. A stakeholder firm places more value on flexibility.  It is relatively less interested in extracting 
the maximum profit from a given opportunity than in retaining flexibility to perform profitably as 
conditions change.  It is also willing to invest more in relationships with external parties 
(partners) that can influence changes in the profit landscape; this is in effect a form of flexibility. 
 
4. A stakeholder firm has less interest in strategies that transfer incomes from other 
stakeholders to owners of equity under conditions of solvency, but a greater interest under 
conditions in which institutional survival is at risk.  We won’t pursue this aspect further in the 
current paper. 
 
Thus we propose that, for a stakeholder firm, the conventional profit motive should be replaced 
with a performance motive whose measurement, at a first approximation, is the likelihood of 
sustainable profitability as a function of its configuration of operations.  In practice, this metric 
may be adjusted by other outcomes, such as favorable employment relations, political 
acceptance or influence, perceptions of social responsibility, etc.  For our purposes, what 
matters is the retention of the landscape metaphor, plus the risk-aversion and flexibility-seeking 
motives described above.  These play the main role in explaining the difference in characteristic 
resource acquisition, learning and innovation strategies we ascribed to the two kinds of firms.  
The effects of these strategies on organizational structure and culture are traced through the 
theory developed in the following section. 
 
IV. The Core Argument: Varieties of Firms, Varieties of Capitalism, and Implications for the 
Position of Workers 
 
At this point, we would like to restate the question underlying this paper: what do the different 
types of firms and of market environments portend for the role of workers within the firm?  In the 
discussion that follows we will make use of three terms that identify aspects of work 
performance and decision-making in organizational contexts, autonomy, coordination and 
integration.  Autonomy refers to the ability to determine and undertake actions without being 
constrained from doing so.  Coordination is the process by which entities within the 
organization, normally at a higher hierarchical level, constrain the actions of individuals and 
groups below them in order to ensure that they adhere to a common plan.  Integration achieves 
this alignment through joint decision-making and action, such that the participating units (people 
or groups) can influence the constraints under which they operate.  It should be obvious that all 
three processes will be found in every organization; in a practical sense, each presupposes the 
others.  Nevertheless the balance and the specific ways they are articulated can vary widely, 
and these variations are the subject of our paper.  In particular, we are interested in the amount 
and type of autonomy exercised by workers and by the extent to which the organizational 
constraints on their work are arrived at through their integration into the larger decision-making 
structure versus being imposed hierarchically through processes over which they have little 
influence. 
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Although four combinations of firms and market types are possible, here we will discuss only the 
two polar cases, the shareholder firm in a liberal environment and the stakeholder firm in a 
coordinated environment. 
 
A. The shareholder firm in a liberal environment 
 
As described above, this firm is assumed to pursue profit maximization.  Due to the relative 
freedom of exit and entry and the lesser attachment of shareholders to the specific assets 
embodied in the firm, there is greater willingness to bear higher risk in return for greater profit 
opportunities.  This implies less interest in investing in marginal improvements to extend the 
(less profitable) stages of its product cycles, and more willingness to acquire new assets or 
otherwise transfer investment to production at earlier stages of their respective product cycles.  
In terms of the profit landscape described above, this takes the form of rapid exploitation of 
existing profit hills, but little incentive to remain in the neighborhood of this local optimum once 
returns begin to diminish (as the landscape shifts).  Speculation on dramatic profit opportunities 
across the entire landscape, even in the absence of sufficient information to moderate risk, is 
relatively more attractive.  This in turn diminishes the incentive to invest in exploration into more 
modest, but more contiguous, opportunities that would build on existing knowledge and 
practices.  Dramatic entry into new markets is more readily achieved through startups, spinoffs 
and acquisitions than internal, incremental innovation. 
 
Such a profit orientation has implications for worker skill and autonomy.  Knowledge as a joint 
product of productive activity is relatively less valued, and there is reduced incentive to invest in 
worker skills that might be repaid through enhanced knowledge acquisition.  At the same time, 
insofar as a liberal environment fosters less skill formation, the firm would find it more costly to 
acquire the requisite human capital for a learning-centered operation.  A second effect of such 
an environment is to emphasize exit over voice in human resources, for several reasons: (1) the 
culture of liberal market economies predisposes parties to such a relationship, (2) there are 
fewer institutional vehicles, such as works councils or co-management, for worker voice, and (3) 
the bias in investment toward early-cycle, high-risk but high-profit potential opportunities 
accentuates the numerical flexibility of employment.  The upshot is a lower commitment, lower-
trust system of employment relations. 
 
The combination of these influences should be reflected in the internal structure of the firm.  
Worker autonomy in job performance will be regarded as primarily a risk to be avoided rather 
than a learning and performance opportunity.  Hierarchy, with its coordination of relatively less 
autonomous but also less integrated workers, will tend to play a larger role.  Horizontal 
communication and collaboration between workers may be employed if teams can be regulated 
to serve the objectives of hierarchical control, essentially as conduits for instructions, but if they 
empower the base they will be viewed as threatening to the primary basis for coordination.  
Forward planning in such a firm is concerned to a much greater extent with shedding and 
acquiring productive units in order to sample various, mostly noncontiguous, areas of the profit 
landscape.  This reinforces the tendency in these firms for personnel practices to favor 
contingency over commitment and continuity.  Finally, the culture and operating rules of the firm 
will reflect shareholder incentives.  This increasingly entails practices which convert reported 
profits into financial incentives for the workforce—incentives which tend to be strongest for 
employees closest to the firm’s investment/disinvestment decision-making. 
 
This stylized model should be qualified, however, to take account of the market environment 
faced by the firm.  All of the above tendencies will be intensified where firms concentrate on the 
early stage development of standardized products.  If product cycles are slow and markets are 
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stable, even a shareholder firm in a liberal environment may find that stable employment 
patterns permit longer term relations in which commitment is beneficial, although in this case 
investments in human capital and decentralized knowledge acquisition are still unlikely.  If the 
firm finds itself in a market that takes the form of customized production in which the fixed costs 
of managerial overhead are distributed across fewer units, it may also rely on greater worker 
autonomy and invest more intensively in skills.  Thus, the structure of incentives may yield 
shareholder firms in a liberal context that resemble the firms we will sketch in the following 
section.  Nevertheless, the impediments to widespread skill formation in such an economy, as 
well as the institutions supportive of worker voice, combined with the greater willingness to 
employ exit and entry in order to pursue new profit opportunities less related to current 
operations, should result in an approach less conducive to worker autonomy and integration 
than one would find among stakeholder firms facing similar market pressures in a coordinated 
environment. 
 
B. The stakeholder firm in a coordinated environment. 
 
This firm values its longevity and therefore pursues relatively lower-risk opportunities to remain 
profitable.  As its performance (likelihood of profitability) landscape changes, then, it will actively 
seek to enhance its knowledge regarding contiguous production and market options.  A 
contiguous opportunity is one which, despite its alterations to existing operations, remains close 
enough such that information about it can be gleaned from reflection and experimentation on 
current work and its outcomes.  To put it differently, innovation is incremental where firms 
pursue primarily contiguous profitability hills, and information is acquired as a joint product 
where workers are free and have the competence to engage in this experimentation.  Reflective 
and experimental work in this context can take the form of problem-solving, tinkering, or using 
productive activities as a means of investigation (such as discussions with customers).  
Similarly, increased flexibility typically requires a more broadly-skilled workforce, the provision of 
opportunities for the acquisition of new skills, and greater roles for learning and autonomous 
action to cope with the complexity burden of more flexible systems and methods. 
 
Thus we expect such firms to invest in skills as well as the conditions for longer term, committed 
employment relations.  This is relatively less costly in a coordinated market environment, since 
general skill formation and institutional vehicles for voice are provided externally, and the 
predominance of stakeholder firms cultivates widespread expectations of commitment and trust.  
One drawback of this orientation, however, is that exit costs are raised, reducing the mobility of 
capital and labor across enterprises, sectors, and products.  A healthy coordinated stakeholder 
economy thus requires a vibrant entrepreneurial sector to redress this imbalance.  However, the 
practices conducive to incremental innovation (contiguous regions on the profitability landscape) 
also cultivate the skills and entrepreneurial inclinations, a capacity to learn in complex 
environments and a willingness to assume responsibility, that might be employed in this sector if 
given the institutional support.  
 
The firm we are describing, in order to maximize its gains from learning as a joint product, will 
assign more importance to worker autonomy, horizontal communication and collaboration, and 
capacity-building.  Workers will have more individual leeway to experiment with ways of doing 
their work, and they will be allowed more opportunities to share their knowledge and search for 
improvements on a group basis.  The firm may even devote costly resources to training workers 
in broader skills or making more of its knowledge base available to them in order to gain greater 
benefit from this learning-by-doing (and by reflecting).  Hierarchical coordination will be de-
emphasized accordingly.  Forward planning, to the extent that it is oriented toward incremental 
improvements rather than discontinuous changes in the firm's asset portfolio, will be linked more 
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closely with individual and especially collective worker input (integration).  The firm, given its 
stakeholder governance and its stake in worker autonomy, will promulgate a culture that 
emphasizes normative integration rather than incentive-driven coordination. 
 
As with the shareholder firm in a liberal environment, the stakeholder firm in a coordinated 
environment is also influenced by its market context.  It will show greater resemblance to its 
shareholder counterpart to the extent that it produces standardized products whose horizon of 
profitability is limited.  This can take the form of reduced stakeholder orientation in small firms 
confined to such a market or a dualist structure in multi-unit firms spread across different 
markets, some of which have these characteristics.  This may arise, for example, in traditional, 
relatively stable manufacturing sectors whose locus of production is steadily shifting to lower-
wage producers abroad. 
 
This stylized account is intended to provide an explanation for what we already know, that 
workers tend to occupy different roles in the organization of work and detailed operations across 
the shareholder/stakeholder and liberal/coordinated market economy divides. 
 
V. Case Study Evidence: Variation in Worker Autonomy, Coordination and Integration in 
Stakeholder and Shareholder Firms and Coordinated and Liberal Environments 
 
A. Scope and methodology 
 
Our research compares firms in the same industries in the US, as an example of a shareholder 
economy, and Germany, a stakeholder economy.  The research units are production sites.   
While the research is ongoing, Table 4 summarizes the three case studies on which this paper 
is based. 
 
Table 4: Case Study Data 
 
 Auto production Beverage processing/packaging 
United States plant of German conglomerate —— 
Germany plant of German conglomerate plant of German conglomerate 
 
As our specific object of investigation, we focused on problem solving by workers, since it lies at 
the intersection of worker autonomy, organizational learning and human resource strategy.  We 
conducted telephone interviews with the plant in the US in late November/early December 2014.  
On-site interviews were conducted with the tea packaging establishment in November 2014 and 
the German auto plant in Fall 2011.  In the US auto plant and the German tea packaging plant 
interviews were conducted with the appropriate managers; in the German auto plant they were 
conducted with a sample of workers across four assembly lines.  In this last case an attempt 
was made to reconcile the differences between worker and managerial perceptions. 
 
The three factories under study differ in industry, age and size. The two auto factories belong to 
the same conglomerate, which is over 70 years old.  It opened its US subsidiary less than 10 
years ago on a greenfield site in a rural area.  The German factory has about 50,000 workers, 
its US counterpart only about 3000.  The tea packaging factory has occupied the same site for 
more than 100 years and averages somewhat over 100 workers, fluctuating with seasonal 
demand. Its parent  conglomerate employs about 1600 workers in Europe. 
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B. Findings 
 
1. Firm strategy.  Both enterprises, the auto producer and the tea packager, have profit 
strategies that adhere to the theoretical prediction.  The auto producer’s main goal is to be able 
to provide a wider variety of options (models and features) to consumers at no extra cost, and to 
reduce the cost of achieving flexibility in the face of fluctuating demand for different types of 
cars.  Both depend on developing multi-purpose assembly operations, such that a variety of 
cars can be produced on the same lines.  This entails a shift to general-purpose machinery 
(programmable on the fly) and broadly-skilled workers.  Workers contribute to learning by 
increasing the firm’s capacity to troubleshoot a complex, flexible production system and by 
introducing incremental innovations that reduce the cost and difficulty of supplying product 
variety.  In this way, the firm takes maximum advantage of the capacities of its workforce while 
enhancing flexibility and adaptation in the local region of its profitability landscape.  Relative to 
some of its competitors, especially those with shareholder governance in liberal economies, it is 
more reluctant to accept the risks of trying to capture the early phases of the product cycle with 
radically different offerings, such as electric vehicles. 
 
The tea packager is concerned primarily with progressively reducing the cost and increasing the 
delivery time reliability of manufacturing and filling its teabags.  This motive applies to both 
standardized teabags and the niche bags that compete in specialized markets.  It doesn’t 
maintain a separate engineering or R&D department, but relies on worker experimentation and 
learning to continuously improve its current operations.  Development of new types of teabags 
and tea products occurs externally. 
 
2. The general place of worker problem-solving in the firm’s culture. 
 
According to official documents, as well as the interviews we conducted with the heads of the 
plants (US, German tea) and assembly workers (German autos), it was made clear that all three 
producers prioritize quality, and that problem-solving by workers is viewed by all of them as a 
core means for achieving it.  This was based on the widespread assumption that workers had 
the capacity to make improvements in their work on their own initiative, encompassing the flow 
of work (autos) and the equipment employed in production (tea).  Workers in the German auto 
plant were also expected to take initiative on the managerial level.  A strong normative impetus, 
however, was apparent only in the tea factory, and, as we learned, it applied only to the 
relatively small core workforce and not to the larger contingent force employed as a buffer. 
 
3. Worker autonomy and capacity for problem-solving 
 
But an active role for workers in problem-solving and organizational learning depends not only 
on higher-level culture and the intentions of the top management, but also workers’ actual ability 
to exercise these functions in their day-to-day work.  We identified two dimensions that underlay 
this activity, workers’ autonomy and capacity.  By autonomy we mean, as before, the freedom of 
workers to take initiative over a range of interventions, and by capacity the possession of the 
relevant skills and knowledge to perform these interventions.  Autonomy is a function of 
organizational form; capacity depends on the personnel strategy of the firm (recruitment and 
skill development), as well as investments in systems that make the necessary information and 
intervention opportunities accessible to the workforce. 
 
Here differences abound.  Workers in both auto plants have substantial leeway to take initiative, 
but the scope is not the same.  In the US workers can identify problems, but there are 
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differences among the managers as to whether workers should be permitted to directly solve 
them.  Instead, supervisors frequently play the role of fixing problems pointed out by workers.  
To some extent this may reflect the lower capacity for such initiative exhibited by the US auto 
workers.  In the German plant workers are clearly able to take initiative on their own, and they 
have the ability to pool their expertise to accomplish tasks beyond the means of single 
individuals.  Meanwhile, the tea factory tells a more differentiated story: there is a stark division 
between the autonomy accorded to qualified (core) and non-qualified workers.  Moreover, the 
capacity to perform interventions is greater in the complex, craft-oriented production processes 
for high-end teabags but lower for the more automated process of producing conventional 
teabags. 
 
4. Methods and systems for problem-solving. 
 
Despite different organizational preconditions, the practical autonomy of workers also depends 
on the extent of standardization embodied in the productive technology: the freedom of workers 
to intervene is constrained by the rules and pacing built into the technology itself.  (Edwards, 
1979)  This constraint is particularly evident in the two auto plants, where highly standardized 
systems and tools limit autonomy beyond the extent determined by formal procedures.  That 
said, teams, which are potentially less constrained by technology than individuals, have more 
freedom to take initiative in the German plant than the US one, while supervisors (compared to 
German Meisters) play a larger role in the US.  At the tea packaging plant the technology is far 
less standardized, and workers can tinker with the systems as they operate them—although 
freedom of initiative is granted and taken in large part on the basis of the social standing of the 
individual worker concerned. 
 
The economic motivation for exercising autonomy also differs across these three 
establishments.  There is little reward for innovation or problem-solving in either the US auto 
plant or the tea packaging plant and moderate rewards in the German auto plant.  To some 
extent, the two operations in Germany depend on intrinsic rewards and normative motivation to 
pursue the aspects of their strategy that depend on worker autonomy. 
 
5. Communication and learning. 
 
Communication can occur prior to the exercise of worker initiative, which enhances worker 
capacity, and also subsequent to it, which enhances and diffuses learning; here we will discuss 
it as a single topic.  Communication is highly restricted in the US auto plant: supervisors control 
who can communicate with whom, and workers do not have access to electronic devices for 
peer connection and access to data.  In the German plant, by contrast, workers can 
communicate across the plant via their respective teams and are outfitted with mobile devices 
and computers that permit a much higher degree of information-sharing.  At the tea packaging 
plant, consistent, with its smaller size, communication is dense and informal. 
 
With respect to communication, it is interesting to see that it is very high in the two factories 
located in a stakeholder environment. The communication in the car factory in the stakeholder 
environment is more standardized than in the smaller tea packaging firm. The subsidiary of the 
car manufacturer in the shareholder environment is highly standardized, and workers are much 
less integrated in it than in the two firms in the stakeholder environment. 
 
But learning can also be analyzed in terms of the nature of the learning process.  Here we 
distinguish between three levels: (a) Single-loop learning seeks improved ways to meet 
predefined objectives.  (b) Double-loop learning seeks improved means but also investigates 
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and potentially alters the objectives.  (c) Deutero-learning is learning how to learn—meta-
learning.  From an empowerment perspective, which encompasses both autonomy and capacity 
for self-development, they constitute a progression from lower to higher. 
 
We found that the US auto plant engaged its workforce primarily in single-loop learning, 
whereas double- and to a lesser extent deutero-learning were common in both German 
production locations, apparently reflecting differences in normative integration at the firm level 
and the expectations generated by predominately shareholder (liberal) and stakeholder 
(coordinated) external environments.  We suspect that higher-order learning is likely to be more 
productive in meeting the strategic goals of the firm; if so, even a formally shareholder 
enterprise in a coordinated environment (the tea packaging plant) holds an advantage relative to 
the formally stakeholder enterprise in a liberal environment (the US auto plant).  One caveat, 
however, is that the learning we describe in the tea establishment applies only to its core 
workforce.  A second is that the age of the establishments may play a role: the US operation is 
by far the youngest, and it make take time before the social and cultural prerequisites of greater 
trust, communication density, and order of learning can be established. 
 
6. Implications 
 
The profit landscape is a metaphor that helps organize one’s thinking about the relationship 
between the main drivers of profitability, the role of flexibility and innovation, and the strategic 
orientation of the firm.  It does not lend itself to explicit calibration.  In that, it resembles the 
evolutionary biologist’s fitness landscape, which is also not observable or measurable.  At most 
one can take transects of a multidimensional landscape to assess the effect of changes in a few 
activities or traits holding constant the rest. 
 
That said, the general narrative of Section IV is supported by these case studies.  The firms had 
adopted strategies that reflected a preference toward enhanced internal flexibility, incremental 
innovation and risk avoidance associated with stakeholder governance.  This even applied to 
the tea packaging operation, which, while formally governed by shareholders (family held), 
operates in the context of a coordinated economy in which stakeholder influence is felt 
systemically and not only at the enterprise level.  Taking into account the entire workforce and 
not only the core workers, there was a clear hierarchy of worker autonomy and capacity for 
initiative, with the German auto plant at the top and the other two “hybrids” beneath.  That is, a 
stakeholder enterprise in a coordinated environment relies to a greater extent on worker 
autonomy and integration to achieve its desired outcomes than either a stakeholder enterprise 
in a liberal environment or a shareholder firm in a coordinated environment.  The specific factors 
that produced this result are consistent with the causal mechanisms identified by our theoretical 
narrative. 
 
Section VI. Conclusion 
 
This paper is intended to serve several purposes: to introduce a novel theory of the firm and its 
key concept, the profit landscape; to demonstrate the application of this theory to the particular 
question of the role of workers in profit-seeking enterprises; to translate the 
shareholder/stakeholder and liberal/coordinated economy literatures into terms that can be 
interpreted by the profit landscape metaphor; and to achieve more broadly an integration of 
economic and managerial perspectives through a theoretical framework consistent with both.  
We have produced a theoretical narrative that contributes to explaining the large differences 
one sees in the role of workers in different types of firms and economic environments, and we 
have offered some case study evidence to indicate that, at least for the three establishments for 
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which we collected data, the theory is supported. 
 
Nevertheless, it should be clear that this paper is just a beginning.  Doing so many things, it 
does none of them comprehensively.  The profit landscape model, and particularly the 
predictions about the proclivities of different types of firms for different optimization strategies, 
could be subjected to a more analytically precise examination.  The stakeholder/shareholder 
and coordinated/liberal dichotomies were sketched at a very general level, and there is much 
greater specificity and nuance in these respective literatures.  We did not offer an explicit theory 
of the ways in which autonomy, coordination and integration interact to provide structure and 
coherence to firms and similar organizations.  (Such models exist, particularly in cybernetic 
approaches.)  Our empirical work considers only three establishments, and even so there is 
much more detail in our findings than we have space to present and examine here. 
 
To conclude, we would like to suggest several promising areas for further research using the 
tools outlined in this paper: 
1. Skill formation and development.  We have not delved deeply into the differences between 
the role of general skills cultivated externally to the firm, firm-specific skills cultivated internally, 
and semi-general skills formed through interactions between the firm and external institutions. 
 
2. The problem of dualization.  Although the distinction between core and peripheral or buffer 
employees plays a crucial role at our tea packaging plant, it appears to some extent throughout 
all sectors of the modern economy.  We need better theoretical understanding of this duality, 
particularly if we wish to formulate policies that, via the landscape metaphor, encourage firms to 
invest in the capacity of a greater share of their workforce in autonomous activity and systematic 
learning. 
 
3. The problem of multinational production systems.  The challenges faced by the German auto 
producer in the US are emblematic of a range of conundrums facing stakeholder firms in liberal 
or otherwise less familiar environments.  Of course, there is a large literature already that 
examines such situations, but we believe the theoretical apparatus developed in this paper has 
something extra to contribute. 
 
4. Labor market institutions, competitive strategy, and trade imbalances.  In practice, national 
currencies do not fluctuate so as to make trade balances a random outcome; most countries are 
persistently in deficit or surplus.  Moreover, in much of Europe a system of fixed exchange rates 
(the eurozone) prevails, and trade imbalances are central to concerns over systemic viability.  In 
this context, calls for adjustment often include labor market reforms, which are predominantly 
directed toward liberalization.  But to what extent does the analysis of this paper suggest a 
countervailing argument?  It could be that excessive liberalization may undermine the cultural, 
organizational and learning-oriented factors that enhance competitive advantage at the firm 
level and trade outcomes at the national level.  (Storm and Naastepad, 2015) 
 
5. Worker autonomy, coordination and integration in emerging economies.  The literatures on 
stakeholder/shareholder firms and coordinated/liberal economies are based on studies in the 
developed countries.  Nevertheless, the future to a large extent belongs to the rapidly expanding 
economies of Asia, Africa and Latin America in which new production models, drawing on 
developed country experience but integrating features appropriate to new locations, will take 
form.  There is a need for more observation of production systems in the emerging economies, 
which, combined with profit landscape analysis, can suggest the strategic orientations like to 
predominate. 
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